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Abstract: Williams’s views on the importance of internal reasons and his denial that 
there can be reasons for an agent to do something that have no relationship to their extend-
ible motivational set are the key to his critical view of moral theory and moral theorists. The 
paper offers a qualified defense of his position on both counts, noting where adjustments 
to it are needed.
Keywords: morality; Williams; utilitarianism; demandingness; practical reason; moral 
motivation, internal reasons, external reasons
One of Bernard Williams’s central philosophical preoccupations was with 
the particularity of persons and the force of their needs and desires. He saw 
this feature writ large in the particularities of their surrounding cultures, with 
their distinctive perspectives and requisites. In his essays ‘Internal and Exter-
nal Reasons’ (1981: 101-113) and ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’ 
(1989), he employed the term ‘motivational set’, to refer to an agent’s “dispo-
sitions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and 
various projects...embodying commitments of the agent.” (1985: 105). Many of 
his writings dealt with the conflict he perceived between empirically real mo-
tivational sets and the generic formulas of obligation of modern moral theory. 
“Unless”, he declared, “I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, proj-
ect, and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all: the world, certainly, as 
a kingdom of moral agents, has no particular claim on my presence or, indeed, 
interest in it.” (1985: 12). 
Philosophy, Williams declared in the first chapter of Ethics and the Limits 
of Philosophy, “should not try to produce ethical theory, though this does not 
mean that philosophy cannot offer any critique of ethical beliefs and ideas.” 
(1985: 17). Practical thought, he insisted, must ask and answer the question 
‘what shall I do?’ (21). And the answer to that question, he argued, is impor-
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tantly personal; there could be no ‘decision procedure for moral reasoning’,11 
nor any listing or tree structure of objective moral facts. Science, the old ‘natu-
ral philosophy’ aims to produce a representation of the world that is ‘inde-
pendent of our perspective and its peculiarities’, but moral philosophy cannot 
do the equivalent (1978: 65-6; 1985: 139). Medical theory and the science of 
materials, by contrast, prove themselves by their efficacy. The prevention of 
premature death and disability and the construction of buildings and bridges 
that stay up are universally valued conditions. But philosophy cannot prove its 
worth through its efficacy in the same way; there is no universally valued con-
dition – that of the morally healthy person or society – and even if there were, 
there would be no way to ‘apply’ moral theory to bring this condition about 
without extreme coercion. Individual persons are not required by any meta-
obligation always to test their proposed courses of action against a theoretical 
norm, nor are entire societies required to do so. In both cases, there are likely 
to be incremental adjustments as features of their situations become clearer to 
them through experience. Perfectionism and utopianism are both misguided. 
We can only adjust our plans and our practices and institutions as our needs 
and desires change.22
The theory of internal reasons upon which these conclusions rest not only 
runs up against strong and frequent objections, it is inconsistent with Wil-
liams’s view of ethics as the shared knowledge and practice of a culture or a 
subculture. The contradiction manifests itself in his puzzlement over the phe-
nomenon of blame in his essay on the ‘Obscurity of Blame’, where he admits 
that people can be blamed for failing to perform actions they had no reason 
to perform. Fortunately, both difficulties can be removed and both Williams’s 
antirealism and the substance of his plea for the individual defended by re-
analysing the notion of an internal reason. This involves taking reason-giving 
to be a discursive activity that always involving a presenter and a presentee. A 
presented reason must belong to someone’s motivational set, though not neces-
sarily that of the presentee who may deny that it is a reason at all. 
Before going on to provide this re-analysis, I will give some further back-
ground to explain Williams’s negative attitude to moral theory. After supply-
ing it, I will address the objection that Williams misjudged the relationship 
between nonmoral practical reasoning and moral reasoning. Moral reasons are 
inherently generic; this feature derives from their function which is the protec-
tion of persons from one another, rather than the protection of persons from 
 1 Cf. Rawls 1951.
 2 For a defense of such incrementalism, see Sen 2009: 263: “I would like to wish good luck to the 
builders of a transcendentally just set of institutions for the whole world”.
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bad luck or the world in general. By their very nature, moral reasons will often 
feel like unwanted impositions and consistency with one’s motivational set is 
not required for a moral reason’s being so. Here Williams’s view of the limits of 
philosophy can still be defended, but only to an extent that is in turn limited. 
1. Context: Anti-Theory 
One of Williams’s points in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy was that 
modern moral theory retained an essentially theological perspective, as sig-
naled in its vocabulary of judgement, assessment, approval and disapproval 
(1985: 37-8).3 Christian ethics had addressed itself to the soul, declaring wealth, 
status, and gender irrelevant to salvation and advocating the setting aside of 
family ties. Kant’s noumenal self, a pure will without any empirically interest-
ing qualities, was the secular substitute for this anonymous, but nevertheless 
responsible soul. Bentham’s hedonic machine that is Everyman was similarly 
anonymised. Williams shared with a number of his contemporaries the con-
viction that the Enlightenment project of rationalising morality had failed, but 
he had no patience with their view that moral theory needed to return to its 
theological roots.44 We should treat God as a dead person, he declared (1985: 
32-3); his attitude to Kantianism was that of Friedrich Nietzsche in Twilight of 
the Idols. Like Nietzsche, he looked back to the Greeks, to whom (apart from 
the Stoics) the idea of a science of general obligations and moral imperatives 
was foreign.
As Williams saw it, with the rise of post-Humean moral theory, ethics, 
which, in ancient philosophy, had been the study of character traits, attitudes 
conducive to tranquillity, and sensible choices, became morality, the study of 
duty and self-sacrifice. Moral theory addresses itself to requirements and ob-
ligations, not to the special requirements and obligations imposed by roles or 
offices, such as being a spouse, or father, or judge, but instead duties pertain-
ing to agents as such. Kant’s proposal that action plans should be formulated 
as maxims and subjected to a test of their universalisability and Bentham’s 
proposal that policies should aim at the general welfare were both aimed at 
dissolving the natural egocentrism and partiality of agents. More recent con-
ceptual devices, such as Rawls’s famous ‘veil of ignorance’, are based on the 
idea that not knowing yourself, being unaware of your talents, weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities, and position in society, is the first step to sound ethical 
 3 A point earlier made by Mackie 1977: 45.
 4 See. Anscombe 1958; McIntyre, 1981; and Taylor 1992, esp. Ch. 25,‘The Conflicts of Modernity’.
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decisions. It might be observed that, as if to compensate for the abstractions 
of moral theory, our culture provides a superabundance of how-to-live advice 
pertaining to relationships that is detailed and specific and that takes account 
of individual differences, rendering Williams’s intellectual nostalgia somewhat 
beside the point. But lifestyle advice is not philosophy, and although Williams 
saw philosophy as limited in what it could do, moral philosophy remained a 
field of enquiry. 
Like the pagans, Williams regarded ethics as the study of how to cope with 
the unpredictability and vicissitudes of life and with the inevitability of one’s 
making trouble for other people. He rejected the view that a secularised, ratio-
nalistic moral theory could demonstrate the existence of obligations or decisive 
reasons for doing and forbearing that were ‘binding’ on agents regardless of 
their own motivational sets. The pretensions of the ‘morality system’ to be able 
to pronounce for or against each of anyone’s significant actions and the pre-
tensions of philosophers to be able to produce the criteria of right and wrong 
in the morality system both deserved to be questioned. Williams objected on 
both metaethical and substantive grounds to modern moral theory. On the 
metaethical side, while acknowledging the occurrence of moral reflection and 
deliberation as empirical phenomena, he denied that their results could is-
sue in the kind of knowledge that the experimental and theoretical sciences 
sought and attained. In his intentionally paradoxical formulation, reflection 
can destroy ethical knowledge (1985: 148). On the substantive side, he entered 
a plea for agents who, in certain circumstances, act unreflectively or contrary 
to utilitarian principles, who show favouritism and who make exceptions of 
themselves, weighting their own impulses and their satisfaction as more im-
portant than other people’s welfare. His view that all reasons for action are 
‘internal reasons’ commands a central position in his overall outlook.
2. Internal Reasons in Williams’s Account
For the strict and unreconstructed Kantian, as noted, a decisive reason to 
forbear from some self-serving action is that you would be unable to will that 
any others in your situation were permitted to do likewise, For the strict and 
unreconstructed Utilitarian, a decisive reason to perform some action is that 
it leads to a net increase in welfare. These are reasons for everyone; to ignore 
them, once they have been presented to you as reasons to do or not to do what 
you were contemplating, is to manifest irrationality or ignorance of human 
nature and the universal desire to escape pain and maximise pleasure. 
Williams took strong exception to the notion that any presented reason, 
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either by virtue of some quasi-logical property such as susceptibility to univer-
salisation, or some naturalistic property, such as the contribution to the general 
welfare, could be a decisive reason for the presentee to act or refrain from 
acting, or impose an obligation on the presentee, regardless of the presentee’s 
motivational set. What a person has reason to do must be related positively 
to their ‘motivational set’ – or to a motivational set sufficiently closely related 
that, without coercion or brainwashing, they could come to internalize the 
presented reasons. As Williams understood it, “A has a reason to Φ only if he 
could reach the conclusion to Φ by a sound deliberative route from the motiva-
tions he already has.” (1989: 35). We could characterise such reasons as having 
a positive relationship to A’s ‘extendible’ motivational set. The notion of such 
a set is, Williams admitted, difficult to make precise. It does not consist of the 
motivations a person would have if they were ideally rational, knew everything 
they ought to know, and had the preferences, desires and interests they ought 
to have.5 Reasons, he thought, must be accessible to the agent as they are, even 
with their limitations and biases. The conclusions reached by sound delibera-
tive routes about what to do in a given situation must accordingly be different 
in at least some cases for Person 1 and Person 2. Some people will deliberate 
and decide to push the fat man off the bridge to stop the runaway train or to 
kill one to save nineteen; others will deliberate and walk away from the situa-
tion, refusing to get blood on their hands. 
The extendible motivational set accordingly occupies the region between 
the introspectively available, empirically real, motivational set and the one that 
would result from removing all errors, biases, knowledge gaps, and distortions 
from a person’s set of beliefs and desires. It is the one that would result from 
removing some errors, biases, knowledge-gaps and distortions in ways that can 
be grasped only by reference to examples. Informing a person about to drink a 
glass of petrol in the mistaken belief that it is gin about what’s actually in it will 
result in rapid revision of their motivational set (1981: 102), leaving them with 
a decisive reason not to drink it, and most people’s motivational sets is extend-
ible by making them aware of facts almost everyone in their situation would 
like to know. Pointing out to the suicidal teenager the fact that everything will 
look better in three months if she stays her hand may, however, have no ef-
fect. Her project is self-destruction now, and she may remain wholeheartedly 
committed to this. Nevertheless, forcible restraint is warranted on the grounds 
that the teenager’s future motivational set will be such that she will come to 
recognise despondency of the sort she was suffering either as no sort of reason 
 5 For a defense of the notion that what you have decisive reason to do and ought to do is what 
your ideally rational and thoroughly informed self would do, see Smith 1994 and Korsgaard 1986.
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at all for suicide or at least not as a decisive reason (1985: 41-2). She will then 
want it to have been the case that no-one let her do it. Our knowledge of the 
(overwhelmingly likely) future supplies us with a warrant for removing the 
aspiration to suicide from her extended motivational set. 
In another of Williams’s fictional examples Owen Wingrave is unresponsive 
to the considerations urged on him by his father, who wants him to join the 
army (1981: 106-7). It’s a family tradition, his father insists, it’s the patriotic 
thing to do, and the threat to the nation is grave. But Owen, being who is, he is 
unmoved by this discourse; these citation are merely presented considerations, 
offering at best ‘pro tanto’ and not decisive reasons. His motivational set is not 
extendible enough for him to see that he has good reason to join the army, that 
he ought to do so. Williams’s ‘Gauguin’ in turn sees that there are good moral 
reasons for a father to remain with and support his wife and children, but he 
cannot acknowledge them as decisive. His strongest motivation arises from 
his project of getting away from civilisation and developing as a painter. The 
reader who condemns him for violation of a Kantian duty, or simply for failing 
to weigh up utilitarian pluses and minuses in his deliberation, is in effect pre-
senting his or her motivating reasons, but these cannot be shown to be more 
binding on Gauguin than the urgings of Owen’s father are on Owen. 
The claim that all reasons for an agent are internal reasons is consistent 
with empirical approaches to moral psychology, with an empiricist approach 
to normativity and the demystification of moral metaphysics.6 That in mor-
ally demanding situations we feel dutiful, compelled by a principle, or driven 
by conscience, imbued with a sense of necessity, does not indicate that moral 
musts and permissions, grounded in decisive reasons and in their absence, 
are objective features of the world. We err in confusing the gravity of morally 
demanding situations with the existence of decisive reasons to do or forbear 
independent of all feelings and perspectives.7
The doctrine that all reasons are someone’s internal reasons has a group ana-
logue and the naturalistic perspective is systematically connected to Williams’s 
scepticism regarding the possibility of meaningful moral criticism across large 
historical or cultural divides. Williams disavowed relativism as a theory, but he 
was inclined to a form of nonjudgementalism with his distinction between ‘no-
tional’ and ‘real’ confrontations. The motivational sets of Aztecs and Samurai 
warriors were so distant from our own that no simple extension of them could 
have altered their treatment of captives and peasants. Presenting them with 
reasons drawn from Kant (sacrificing captives and slaying peasants is treating 
 6 See Prinz 2007 and Joyce 2001.
 7 See Mackie 1977, Ch. 1.
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them as a means, not as ends in themselves; clearly you would be unwilling to 
universalise the maxim) or from Bentham (the pains of a multitude of peasants 
outweigh the pleasures of small bands of warriors) would draw blanks. 
The weak motivational force of modern moral philosophy is not only evi-
dent when one imagines its considerations being presented in such remote con-
texts. It is apparent in the resistance to utilitarian demands, for example, for 
reductions in luxury consumption, for vegetarianism, for higher taxes for the 
rich, that elicit the response, ‘I can see that that would be the rational/welfare 
enhancing thing to do, but I cannot extend my motivational set to recognise as 
decisive the reasons you present me with.’ As Thomas Nagel remarks, I could 
stop going to restaurants and donate the money saved to charity, but it would 
take an act of conversion (Nagel 1986: 190).
For a culture to have a reason to change its practices on the grounds that 
they are cruel, exploitative, ‘barbaric’ or just selfish, it must be the case that 
its personnel could come to repudiate their existing practice through a sound 
deliberative route in a way that differentiates between Society1, for whom re-
form is accessible from where they are now, and Society 2, for whom it is not. 
In insisting that the men of Society 2 have decisive reason to stop beating their 
womenfolk, and that the women of society 2 have decisive reason to stop put-
ting up with this from their menfolk, or that its elders have decisive reason 
for not sending its children into textile factories, despite the inaccessibility of 
these reasons from where they are now, we can only mean, according to Wil-
liams that the world would be a better place if these practices came to an end. 
We are entitled to moral confidence that it would be a better place and that 
grave moral harms would no longer be perpetrated. We need not relinquish 
our habits of judgement or even suppress our feelings of blame. We can hope 
that reasons that are not accessible to them now will become so. But this can 
only happen when the problems of authority or honour or poverty that the 
practices are meant to solve cease to face them with such urgency, or are seen 
to be soluble in another way. 
3. ‘External’ Reasons are Presenter Internal 
The rejection of all external reasons of the sort moral philosophy is sup-
posed to provide runs up against the objection that, commonsensically, it is 
often the case that people have reason to do things and ought to do things they 
are not motivated to do, and would not or could not be motivated to do, even 
with access to better information about how the world is and what is likely to 
happen. External reasons seem to apply to the cases of agents who are not only 
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ignorant of them but unresponsive to their being presented. They seem to be 
discoverable in reflection and deliberation, just as agents can also discover that 
something they took to be a reason is not even a consideration.8 
External reasons dependent on no one in particular’s motivational set seem 
to function in the case of applied logic and mathematics. That P implies Q is a 
decisive reason for you to infer Q, given P. You ought to do so and you are – it 
seems – objectively in the wrong if you fail to do so. The meaning of the terms 
provides a decisive reason as well to write ‘49’ given the arithmetic problem 
‘7 x7 =’. When it comes to doing or forbearing in the realm of practical ac-
tion there seem to be reasons that are equally objective and decisive. A tourist 
ought not to walk in the jungle without sturdy, snake-proof footwear, whether 
they realize this or not and regardless of their barefoot preferences. If, having 
been presented with the information that there are snakes in this jungle, you 
persist in denying that you have a reason to wear shoes, you are, it seems, just 
wrong. You really ought to wear shoes. 
As observed in connection with the suicidal teenager, frequently, reasons 
for doing or forbearing in the practical realm are actively resisted by those to 
whom they are presented. In ordinary conversation, reasons are urged precise-
ly upon those people who may be aware of them as considerations but who ap-
pear to care insufficiently about them. If a motive belongs to someone’s exist-
ing motivational set, they will already be acting in accord with it. So the point 
of presenting reasons can only be to try to extend the presentees motivational 
set in a way considered appropriate by the presenter. But if the effort fails, it 
can seem that it is still the case that the presentee ought to do the thing and 
has decisive reasons to do so. Here are some examples of normative reasons 
that seem to apply to people even when they are absent from their extendible 
motivational sets:9
A reason not to smoke is that smoking causes a variety of unpleasant illnesses and 
premature death. 
A reason to save money is that someday you may be unable to earn it. 
A reason for your nearsighted child to get glasses is to be able to see the blackboard in 
school. 
There are two responses a defender of Williams might make at this point. 
First, the smoker, the spendthrift and the parents of the nearsighted child 
either have extendible motivational sets that will acknowledge the consider-
 8 Scanlon 2014 argues for domain-specific ontologies that can accommodate moral reasons inde-
pendent of motivational sets.
 9 For further discussion of the phenomenon of resistance to reasons, v. Milgram 1996.
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ations cited if they are presented, in which case these are indeed reasons for 
them. Alternatively, as in Owen’s case, they may resist, perhaps because there 
is some special feature of their own situation that makes this generally good 
advice irrelevant. Some prudential reasons just don’t in apply to individuals. 
For some people, it’s false that they shouldn’t smoke because they will die soon 
anyway of unrelated causes, and it gives them a lot of pleasure; others need not 
save money. It is not hard to think what circumstances could falsify the pro-
posal that nearsighted Sally ought to get glasses because of something unusual 
about her condition. If Sally would rather die than wear glasses, some other 
solution to her blackboard problem will need to be found. When it comes to 
the higher mathematics, it is wrong to insist that everybody, including little 
children and illiterate peasants of the Caucasus ought to give, has reason to 
give, the correct solution to some partial derivative equation because they can-
not. But there is nothing special about the presented considerations that make 
them decisive reasons. Something cannot attain the ontological status of an 
external reason just because, on some occasions, persons who reject a pre-
sented reason as irrelevant to them appear to be behaving unreasonably, or 
self-destructively.
A second possible response is that, as ‘ought’ suggests capability, but does 
not imply ‘can,’ where the actor envisioned is concerned, ‘have reason to do’ 
suggests a fit with the actors extendible motivational set, where the actor envi-
sioned is concerned, without implying it. As Moti Mizrahi argues, a pathologi-
cally jealous person ought to be more trusting of their spouse, even if they are 
psychologically unable to repress or rid themselves of their emotion (Mizrahi 
2009). The motivational set that grounds the reason may be that of the pre-
senter rather than the presentee. (The world would be an overall better place, 
we can agree, if this person were not a jealous maniac.) The internalists will ac-
cordingly need to modify their account. We begin by insisting that the ‘reasons 
statements’ cited represent assertions S could make in an advice-giving session 
to an agent A in which S is presenting reasons for A to Φ, and A is considering 
them, taking them on board, waving them away, indignantly rejecting them, or 
displaying some other form of acceptance or rejection. Someone S who pres-
ents R as a decisive reason for A to Φ, as in the cases above, implies either that 
R would be an element of S’s own motivational set if S were in A’s position, or 
(in case S feels himself to be an exception), that people like A generally have R 
in their extendible motivational set; they can get to R even if they are not there 
yet. If we, considering the case, agree with S that A has decisive reason to Φ, 
and ought to Φ, whether A agrees or not, we are in the same epistemic position 
as S. We are virtually presenting R to A. 
The upshot is that, contrary to what Williams’s appeared to claim, there are 
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practical reasons that apply to but do not belong to the extendible motivational 
sets of their targets. They qualify as reasons, however, only because of their 
relation to the motivational sets of an assumed presenter or an assumed com-
munity. All this was well understood by Adam Smith who supposed that the 
assessment of behaviour (in this case, planned behaviour) always took place 
against a background of opinions concerning ‘propriety’ as he called it, the 
appropriateness of values and the ability of people to realise them.10 People in 
general are motivated not to be sick and to die prematurely, not to be impov-
erished, and to furnish their children with an education. Our grasp of reasons 
and oughts has a factual feel to it that obscures its dependence on culture-
specific aims and values.
Presented reasons are nevertheless ‘internal’ to S or S’s community, and the 
consideration S presents to A as a reason will only be accepted by A if A is able 
to find it in or incorporate it into their motivational set. Further:
1) Even ‘common’ motivations are to some extent culturally 
specific. We can imagine flourishing human communities 
in which quitting smoking, saving money, and seeing the 
blackboard or succeeding in school are irrelevant to their 
way of life. There is no ‘domain’ of practical reason as such. 
2) Even in contexts and cases in which such reasons are gener-
ally decisive and people generally ought to do these things, 
there may be special features of the individual case that 
make the presented reasons nugatory. 
3) There is a continuum between presented reasons that re-
flect common motivations and values and presented reasons 
that reflect only the values and motivations of subgroups 
or individuals. Owen’s father’s presented reasons are inter-
esting in this regard. Family traditions and patriotism lie 
somewhere in between the two extremes. 
To sum up and formalize, the problem of internal and external reasons is in 
some respects a problem of language. The following argument seems correct 
on first reading. 
1) It would be incoherent to suggest that a person ought to do 
something they have no reason to do. 
2) What a person has reason to do must be related positively to 
their ‘motivational set,’ more precisely to their ‘extendible 
 10  Smith 2010 Part I, Sect. 1, ch 3, et passim.
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motivational set,’ understood empirically and not idealisti-
cally. 
3) So, what a person ought to do must be related positively to 
their extendible motivational set. 
But then, contradicting 3): 
4) It is often the case that people have reason to do, and ought 
to do things they are not at all motivated to do and that lie 
outside their extendible motivational sets. 
 1) is however ambiguous. It can be read as: 
1a) It would be incoherent (for me) to suggest that a person 
ought to do something they have (from my perspective) no 
reason to do. 
1b) It would be incoherent (for me) to suggest that a person 
ought to do something they have (from their perspective) 
no reason to do. 
The 1a) reading makes a true statement. But it does not imply 2) and 3). It is 
consistent with 4) so we have no problem. The 1b) reading does not make a 
true statement. So 2) and 3) do not follow, and there is no conflict with 4). At 
the same time, the possibility of asserting 1) in its b) sense, does not show that 
there are reasons and ‘oughts’ independent of all motivational sets. It would 
be incoherent for me to assert that a person has reason to do and ought to do 
something that belongs neither to their, nor to my extendible motivational set, 
nor to that I suppose internal to other reasonable people. 
There is no barrier to thinking ‘There are perhaps some things I really ought 
to do that I am not currently motivated to do and could not be persuaded to 
want to do.’ This just means: perhaps I shall someday develop some new moti-
vations and ‘recognise’ some new decisive reasons.
Blame, on the analysis given, is not obscure in the way that puzzled Wil-
liams. We sometimes blame people for doing things they had, from their per-
spective, no reason to do, because we view them as having resisted or ignored 
reasons that, from our own internal perspectives, should have and could have 
been part of their motivational sets. (‘I told him and told him!’) In other situa-
tions we do not blame them, recognising that it would have been too much to 
have expected them to act on the presented reasons. 
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4. The Disunity of Practical Reason
There is another reason for questioning the exclusivity of internal reasons. 
It is substantive rather than metaethical. Arguably, Williams did not recognise 
the distinctive nature of moral deliberation. There is a profound difference, 
the critic of internalism might argue, between, on one hand, cultural prac-
tices that make sense or fail to in different environments, and that are backed 
by locally relevant reasons, and moral practices on the other. There is also a 
profound difference between ‘exceptions’ made for individuals from gener-
ally applicable practical ‘oughts’ such as saving money or wearing glasses and 
‘exceptions’ made for individuals from moral ‘oughts’ such as telling the truth. 
Morality, with its formulas of obligation, prohibition, and permission, con-
cerns the harms that individuals do to those near them, and that groups do 
to other nearby groups, in pursuit of their own comfort and enjoyment or ad-
vancement. The ‘morality system’ curbs the exercise of power and privilege in 
strong and fortunate individuals and groups. Because it is revisionary and con-
straining, it invites bids for exemptions and exceptions, but such bids on the 
part of the powerful and privileged are unacceptable by definition. Further, 
the critic maintains, moral practices are intended to reflect the deepest human 
needs, vulnerabilities and capabilities; accordingly, good moral practices must 
be good for any and all cultures. 
Someone can dissociate themselves from the values of logical acumen, ar-
ithmetical competence, safety, thrift and other common values, the critic of 
moral internalism continues, insisting that, being who they are, having the mo-
tivational set they do, certain presented reasons for acting or forbearing do not 
apply to them, and we observers can recognise that their claim for an exemp-
tion is valid, that what’s good practical advice for most people isn’t for them. 
But someone who claims to dissociate from the values of honesty, kindness, 
co-operation, and trustworthiness, because of who they are, because, having 
the motivational set they do, they are exempt from the moral oughts applicable 
to most people, can never, it seems, be endorsed in this opinion. Cross-cultural 
moral criticism, and the criticism of morally careless individuals, is not like 
the pointless criticism of foreign table manners or unmathematical grown ups. 
 In prudential deliberation and advising we normally start with a rough 
conception of what the average person ought to do and refine it in light of the 
ways in which this individual – who may be myself – may be different in their 
needs or abilities. Nobody would make medical or financial decisions about 
themselves as if from behind the veil of ignorance or offer advice to other as 
though nothing whatsoever about the situation and character of the presentee 
were to be taken into account. But Williams opens himself up to the objection 
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that he assimilates moral to practical reasoning in his ‘Gauguin’ case (1981: 
20-39) by bringing luck and success into the picture, encouraging the mistaken 
impression that Gauguin’s problem is mainly whether to take the risk of failing 
to become a successful artist. In moral deliberation and advising, it seems, we 
start with the individual predicament and try to elevate it to a more general 
one. Moral argument involves an attempt to persuade people and groups that 
they are not special, in the strength of their appetites and capabilities, or in 
their status or relationships, or even the painfulness of their dilemmas, and 
that they cannot claim exemptions that would not be available to everyone else. 
The exact same temptation to lie or thieve or betray has faced tens of thousands 
or millions of other people, and, if you were on the receiving end, we remind 
the presentee of a moral reason, you wouldn’t like having done to you what 
you are about to do to someone else. Moral theory predicts our resistance to 
exceptionalism and codifies some version of universalisation, or consideration 
from behind the veil, as essential to moral, though not prudential deliberation. 
Although the critic is right to stress the differences between moral and 
practical deliberation, it is important to see that generic moral reasons cannot 
be ineluctable. Even Kant himself did not go so far, admitting some excep-
tions to his denial of the right to lie and his proscription on suicide. On some 
occasions, it is too much to ask of a particular individual that they be kind, or 
honest, or benevolent, or, in Gauguin’s case, loyal and dependable. We can 
agree with Williams that it is asking too much of him, because of what he 
knows about himself and what he wants, to demand that he give up his project 
and remain at home with his family. Meanwhile, the virtues remain the virtues 
and are so ‘for’ all human beings everywhere, insofar as they belong to ‘our’ 
motivational set. 
For Williams, it was too much to ask of Aristotle’s generation that they re-
ject slavery as an institution. As he says in Shame and Necessity, they could 
envision no other way to get their work done. They had ‘nothing to put in place 
of it’ (1993: 112-14). The perception of slavery as an optional social condition 
that could be legislated out of existence was unavailable. So they rationalised 
matters in their theory of slavery: it was either a condition deserved on the 
basis of one’s endowments, or grossly bad luck, like suffering for a crime one 
did not commit.11 The claustration of women had similar features. For millen-
nia, urban societies faced two core problems: maintaining stable population 
levels, despite warfare on one hand and high levels of fertility on the other, and 
controlling violence, including fights over women motivated by sexual compe-
tition. They also had an interest in verifiable lineages. Restricting the mobility 
 11 Aristotle, Politics Book I: iii-vii.
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and participation of women looked like a good solution to all these problems, 
and, as Williams surmises of the slaves, any complaints were not taken too seri-
ously (1993:112). We can look back on those days with horror and sadness at 
what was done to people, and with dismay at the self-deception and seemingly 
wilful ignorance of the powerful, but ‘blame’ is an attitude better reserved for 
those with whom we are currently engaged. 
In both cases – slavery and the oppression of women – the motivational sets 
of those best able to effect social change altered as other solutions to the prob-
lems their societies faced emerged, and as technological innovations, such as 
printing, enabled slaves and women to articulate their sufferings and present 
their competencies to others. We can perhaps expect the same thing to happen 
with the current issues of animal cruelty (but how can we eat well?) global pov-
erty (but how can we live pleasantly?) and economic exploitation (but where 
will I get my clothes and electronics?). But it is too much to ask of us now, that 
we all become vegetarians, wear our old clothes, and give away most of our 
income to charity. We may get there, and, if we do, the existence of a tradition 
of moral theorising, which tells us that the suffering of all percipient entities 
matters equally, may have helped to push us along, as well as to articulate 
principled justifications for new practices. But the new decisive reasons that 
will become part of our motivational sets in that case will have been brought 
into being by the discovery of alternative ways of doing things that solve our 
problems at less moral expense. 
5. Conclusions 
In this essay, I have supported Williams’s position that, like all consider-
ation-presenting assertions, the presentation of Kantian or utilitarian consid-
erations to A must reflect someone’s motivational set: A’s, the presenter’s, or 
‘ours’. Metaethically, philosophical considerations such as: ‘Because you could 
not will that everyone would do likewise in your situation.’ ‘Because your pains 
and pleasures are no more important than anyone else’s’ are not on a different 
epistemic footing from ‘Because it’s the family tradition,’ and the limits of phi-
losophy are such that one can possess a motivational set that is unresponsive to 
those sort of reasons without being irrational. In the realm of practice, a merci-
ful attitude towards people who fail to do what, in general, a person ought to 
do because of their situation and character, is sometimes the right one to take, 
as it certainly is in the case of ‘Gauguin.’ Nevertheless, Kantian and utilitar-
ian reasons are the right sorts of reasons to present to people when morality is 
involved. They are consistent with the ‘morality system’s’ function of curbing 
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excess power, stimulating altruistic action, and opposing raw self-interest. Wil-
liams recognized that this was its function, pointing out that ‘ethical egoism’ 
was incoherent (1981: 12), but he paid little attention to the question whether 
modern moral theory had or continues to have an important and worthy role 
to play in the social and political realm.
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